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Article
Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable theoretical and 
empirical interest in the relationship of social networks to 
culture (see, for example, Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; 
Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010; for reviews, see Fuhse, 2009, and 
Mische, 2011). These studies have viewed culture as norma-
tive commitments to identities or worldviews and shared 
expectations. Culture is also considered to be distinct and 
relatively autonomous from social network structure that is 
defined as “influential and persistent sets of interrelation-
ships among actors” (Spillman, 1995, p. 132, quoted in 
Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010). In the present article, we study the 
influence of culture on network structure by focusing on how 
the entangled worlds of caste, tribe, and development shape 
social network structures in a south Indian village.
In this article, we conceptualize culture not only as a con-
stellation of idioms derived from abstract value systems or 
disembodied social norms, but also as the negotiation of 
these idioms in everyday life. Thus, culture (as values or 
norms) is enacted variably and fluidly in everyday practice 
of individuals and collectives. By being enacted in everyday 
practice, it becomes dynamic, material, and embodied. And, 
it is by becoming material and embodied, by being practised, 
that culture shapes the composition and structure of social 
networks and forms the basis for the meanings (the nature of 
trust, respect, friendship, love, etc.) that people attach to ties 
and transactions in a network (Fuhse, 2009). Therefore, net-
works are “infused with—and help to shape—the norms and 
expectations that define a local culture” (Hanson & Blake, 
2009, p. 146).
Much network analytic work and related studies on social 
and institutional proximity have tended to view the “cul-
tural” predominantly in terms of a “sense of belonging,” aris-
ing out of shared commitments and expectations (see, for 
example, Boschma, 2005; Maenning & Ölschläger, 2010; 
Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010). Such a view tends to take politics 
out of cultures by omitting central elements such as dissen-
sus, exclusion, and domination. Thus, although cultural 
“sharedness” may be important, it is limited by (a) the lack of 
acceptance of dominant norms and worldviews by “margin-
alized” or “peripheral” groups of people; (b) overlapping and 
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multiple identities held by people, only some of which may 
be shared with others linked in dyads, triads, or larger com-
ponents in a network; and (c) relations of unequal power per-
sisting “between different ‘speakers’ within the same cultural 
circuit” (Hall, 1997, p. 11). Adopting this multifaceted 
understanding of culture, we argue that network composition 
and structures (shaped by cultural patterns) are better viewed 
as expressions of sharedness and difference. People may 
routinely form close social ties with others who share a nor-
mative commitment to a cultural identity or worldview, but 
such expressions of homophily may be accompanied by het-
erogeneity in terms of adherence to other identities and 
worldviews, as well as exclusion of those belonging to “infe-
rior” identities.
The specific cultural idioms under our purview are those 
related to caste (community, hierarchy, leadership) and their 
entanglement with the culture of community-driven rural 
development (brokerage, patronage, constituency) in a south 
Indian village. Caste provides a particularly illustrative case 
of a cultural institution where sharedness and disparity (as 
domination and inequality) co-exist with each other in a state 
of perpetual tension (Dumont, 1980). It is a “live force in 
modern Indian culture and politics” (Satyanarayana, 2014, p. 
48), which exercises a powerful cultural influence on the 
Indian politico-economic order (Deshpande, 2001; Fuller, 
1996a; Micheluti, 2007). Three interrelated facets of caste 
are considered central: It is a maker of (single caste) com-
munities, of inter-caste dominance and hierarchy laid down 
at birth, and of leadership within intra-caste communities in 
the form of the caste headman. All three of these facets of 
caste, by infusing everyday practice, influence the shaping of 
social networks.
Unlike castes, India’s indigenous tribes (Adivasi) have 
been argued to inhabit a non-stratified social order (Sarkar & 
Dasgupta, 2007). Yet, like castes, tribal affiliation affords 
community, identity, and leadership provided by (tribe) head-
men. This community and Adivasi identity is cemented by the 
government category of Scheduled Tribe (ST), which is used 
as the basis of reservations for jobs and places in (educa-
tional) institutions. Similar reservations are targeted at the 
Dalits (or Scheduled Castes). Both Dalit and Adivasi groups 
have historically suffered discrimination and exploitation at 
the hands of the upper castes (Mies, 1976; Steur, 2014). And 
at many levels, Adivasis have been drawn into the caste sys-
tem, “becoming a part of the caste-based division of labour” 
and “most usually at the bottom of the social ladder” (Agrawal, 
2004, p. 225; see also von Fürer-Haimendorf, 1982). This is 
particularly true in villages where Adivasis reside alongside 
other castes. For this reason, in the remainder of this article, 
we will treat the tribal groups inhabiting the village under 
study in the same way as caste groups, while remaining cog-
nizant of the potentially problematic nature of such a treat-
ment (see Baviskar, 2005, for an illustrative example).
Now this culture of castes (and tribes) in rural India is 
entangled with the world of rural development. For example, 
the entry of community development institutions with their 
emphasis on “local resource persons” and “community 
spokespersons” has created new opportunities for brokerage 
and patronage within villages, which intersect with the three 
facets of caste discussed above. Our main objective in this 
article therefore is to examine how entangled cultures of 
caste and rural development get translated into community 
network structure at the village level. We enact this in two 
steps. First, using data on the social network of a multi-caste 
village in Andhra Pradesh (AP), we examine the caste com-
position of close-knit communities or clusters in the village’s 
network and ask to what extent development institutions 
mediate the relationship between caste identities and the net-
worked communities observed. To delineate the clusters, we 
use numerical methods for identifying community structure 
in networks developed by Newman (2006). Second, based 
on qualitative information collected in the village, we ana-
lyze how leaders of each cluster are able to act as local 
patrons, deriving their authority and legitimacy from caste 
headmanship as well as development brokerage and patron-
age. Through this study of the influence of caste identity, 
intra-caste leadership, and development patronage on peo-
ple’s friendship networks in the village, our aim is to explain 
the cultural underpinnings of emergent social network struc-
tures. We find that development-induced brokerage and 
patronage, while often aligning with the three facets of caste 
(community, hierarchy, and leadership), have transformed 
caste’s influence on intra-caste and inter-caste ties, as well as 
reconstituted caste-based leadership.
The article is structured as follows. In the section “Political 
Cultures of Caste and Development in South India,” we 
briefly discuss the literature on post-colonial politics of caste 
at the village level in south India, which may foster caste-
based collective identity and community ties. In section “The 
Village and Its Social Network,” we introduce the social 
economy of the village under study and outline its caste com-
position. In section “Results and Discussion,” the results are 
presented and discussed, and a final section draws some 
conclusions.
Political Cultures of Caste and 
Development in South India
Recent scholarship on caste has attempted to unpack the rela-
tionship between two primary facets of caste—hierarchy and 
community. Under the ethnicization that castes (and tribes) 
have witnessed in India since the late 1980s (Natarajan, 2011; 
Reddy, 2005), castes as “ethnic groups don’t just experience 
the world in terms of ‘we-them relations,’ but play a role in 
producing them” (Reddy, 2005, p. 554). Indeed, in the 1990s, 
individual castes increasingly portrayed themselves as ethnic 
groups, claiming to possess a distinctive culture and “way of 
life” (Fuller, 1996b). This ethnicization is argued to have pro-
duced a weakening of the hierarchical aspects of the caste 
system, reducing it to a horizontal array of consolidated 
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castes (Fuller, 1996b), leading some to claim that the caste 
system has collapsed, only “a plethora of assertive caste 
identities” remain (Gupta, 2004, p. x).
Furthermore, studies have highlighted the continued 
emancipation of the so-called “lower” castes in south India, 
which has brought about either a conscious rejection of dom-
inant Hindu norms and worldviews and/or a strategic mobi-
lization of alternate “traditions” that do not have their roots 
in mainstream Hinduism (see, for example, Ilaiah, 1996; 
Karanth, 2004; Still, 2009). Going against Moffat’s (1979) 
classic argument that lower caste groups accept their subor-
dination because they share the “value system of the upper 
castes” and replicate it among themselves (Still, 2009, p. 10), 
the new understanding of caste brings relations of power, dif-
ference, and subversion of dominant value systems to the 
center. And perhaps to counter the widespread challenging 
(and purported weakening) of the caste system’s hierarchical 
order, Hindu nationalist parties such as the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) and Shiv Sena have supported the reinstatement 
of caste system’s hierarchical order since the 1980s (Mines, 
2005, pp. 201-208).
These wider (national, regional) political processes of 
caste consolidation and supposed weakening of inter-caste 
hierarchy influence caste cultures at the village level. People 
in villages selectively use their awareness of, and ties to, 
national and regional political (and/or religious) movements 
in their local struggles for greater recognition and dignity 
(Mines, 2002; Somjee, 1973). This is evident in recent strug-
gles for equality waged by Dalits in south Indian villages 
(see Arun, 2007; Mines, 2002; Still, 2009; Vincentnathan, 
1996), often led by a new generation of young educated 
Dalits rebelling against past atrocities committed by the 
“upper” castes (Satyanarayana, 2014).1 In fact, many new 
Dalit (and other “lower” caste) leaders in south Indian rural 
and urban areas have attempted to reframe caste as an 
empowering identity, a source of pride, solidarity, and self-
respect (Satyanarayana, 2014). In response, the upper castes 
have staged their own “assertions of identity” (Owens, 2000, 
p. 704), by appropriating national and regional political 
developments such as the rise of the BJP with its upper caste 
leadership and by directly competing (as a caste group) with 
the lower castes for appropriating local and non-local 
resources (Mendelsohn, 1993; Mines, 2005; Rao & Sanyal, 
2010). These different assertions of cultural (caste) identity 
at the village level may reinforce caste-based community ties 
among lower and upper castes.
Often, these assertions of identity and consolidation of 
caste community at the village level are enacted in a space 
that is at the same time heavily shaped by development inter-
ventions. In particular, development projects specifically tar-
geted at the lower castes, or a legislation stipulating lower 
caste political representation in village councils, may foster 
the consolidation of local caste-based communities. To reach 
the dispossessed through rural development, since the 1980s, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), sometimes funded 
by European donor NGOs, began targeting their programs 
toward specific development constituencies such as “mar-
ginal farmers” and “landless labourers” who often belonged 
to the lower castes (Mosse, 1999). Similarly, the 73rd consti-
tutional amendment of 1992-1993 made Gram Panchayats 
(GPs), or village councils, mandatory in all villages in India 
(Johnson, 2003; Tanabe, 2007). GP membership, elected to 
5-year terms, must be representative of the caste composition 
(share in local population) of a village.2 Caste differences 
and identity are mobilized at the local level in electing the 
multi-caste GPs, despite the government’s aim to diminish 
caste differences by promoting decentralized democracy. 
This mobilization of caste identity and difference for local 
governance may support the furthering of intra-caste ties.
Multi-caste democratic governance in villages may also 
create spaces of deliberation (Rao & Sanyal, 2010), under 
which novel forms of cooperation must be sought among 
leaders of the different castes to use development funds for 
the benefit of multiple castes in a village. In fact, caste may be 
deployed “as the basis for providing fairer entitlement and 
enfranchisement for different groups” (Tanabe, 2007, p. 568). 
Such caste-based negotiation for distribution of resources at 
the village level may lead to a weakening of the hierarchical 
order of the local caste system, which may in turn assist in the 
formation of new inter-caste (friendship) relations. This out-
come does not obviously have to arise in all villages and 
between all castes. In her ethnography in an AP village, Still 
(2013) observes that although the hierarchical order may be 
weakening among the different non-Dalit castes, the divide 
between Dalits and the upper castes may at the same time be 
getting sharper (often playing out in the form of the upper 
castes’ resentment against government reservations for Dalits 
as Scheduled Castes). This implies that inter-caste ties may be 
formed more easily between members of non-Dalit castes 
rather than between Dalits and non-Dalits.
Furthermore, negotiations with other castes (including 
Dalits) for making village-level governance decisions, rather 
than involving all members of a caste, may primarily be carried 
out by the leaders of each caste group (Arora, 2009; Tanabe, 
2007). These leaders can be “traditional” caste headmen, if 
they qualify to stand in the elections for GP membership.3 Or, 
they may be the “new leaders” or GP members who are often 
elected with the support of the caste headmen. Together these 
new and old leaders then act as “gatekeepers” between the vil-
lagers and governmental (and/or non-governmental) institu-
tions controlling the disbursal of development funds (Ananth 
Pur & Moore, 2010).4 These leaders, often named as local 
“resource persons” in community-driven projects for poverty 
reduction (Prasad, Ramanjaneyulu, Ravindra, & Sanghi, 2008; 
Swaminathan & Jeyaranjan, 2008), may channel development 
funds to “their poor” (Mosse, 1995). Through this, and by 
helping to organize special favors for (some of) their “group”, 
such as facilitation in finding jobs or admissions to educa-
tional institutions through the development agencies, the lead-
ers may foster the formation of a tight-knit community of 
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followers around them. Thus, by acting as their group’s rep-
resentatives in negotiating with outside governmental and 
non-governmental agencies, these leaders help create loyalty 
and internal solidarity in their community/constituency. 
Through such development-related patronage then, the local 
leaders gain honor and respect while material benefits flow 
to their community - constituency that may contain members 
belonging to multiple castes (cf. Price, 2006).
The foregoing arguments may give the impression that 
caste-based domination has now been decimated in south 
Indian villages. Unfortunately, this would still be an inaccurate 
description of caste culture in many villages. Although caste 
domination may have weakened in some villages, Dalits and 
other lower castes may continue to be excluded from partici-
pating in actual GP-led governance, except in villages where 
they are numerically dominant (Ananth Pur & Moore, 2010). 
And in villages where the president of the council is stipulated 
to be a Dalit (woman), upper castes either attempt to get a “pli-
able” Dalit elected as the president or they may militate against 
her authority, often restricting her governance powers to token 
signatures on official documents (Sivanna, 2014). Even in 
Kerala which is hailed worldwide as a model of inclusive 
development, and where it was claimed that caste hierarchies 
had been overcome as a result of land reforms and other pro-
gressive policies of the ruling communist party since the 
1960s, caste’s culture of inequality continues to hold sway in 
many villages and material deprivation is rife among the lower 
castes (Devika, 2013), as is their exclusion from processes of 
local governance beyond passive attendance when invited 
(Williams, Thampi, Narayana, Nandigama, & Bhattacharyya, 
2012). In addition, in most south Indian villages, a “Dalit col-
ony” continues to be located outside the boundaries of the main 
(upper caste) village (e.g., see Devika, 2013; Still, 2013; 
Vincentnathan, 1996). This segregation is just one among 
many manifestations of entrenched caste-based inequality that 
continues to plague villages in south (and north) India, which 
may include lower agricultural wages for Dalit laborers, refusal 
of services to Dalits by barbers, association of Dalits with dirti-
ness and laziness, and denial of access to temples and burial 
grounds (Deshpande, 2002; Devika, 2013; Sooryamoorthy, 
2008; Still, 2013). Overall, such everyday inequalities may 
continue to limit the formation of inter-caste friendship ties 
(especially between Dalits and non-Dalits).
In summary, the foregoing discussion has highlighted that 
although the hierarchical facets of the caste system may have 
weakened, they have not disappeared, and the importance of 
caste as a cultural identity and forger of community ties 
(through solidarity and through leadership–constituency 
relations) has only become stronger. We pointed to several 
factors, related to the entangled cultures of caste and devel-
opment in rural south India, which have acted as drivers of 
community consolidation and of weakening hierarchy. 
Although these dynamics are likely to play out differently (to 
varying degree and taking diverse trajectories) in different 
places, we expect that caste-based similarity and cultural 
sharedness may still drive the formation of densely con-
nected intra-caste communities or clusters, while new inter-
caste (friendship) ties may be getting formed, mediated by 
development institutions and other cultural-political forces. 
In the following, by identifying tight-knit clusters in the 
social network of a village in AP, we investigate to what 
extent this is the case and what different factors are at play in 
the formation of the clusters.
The Village and Its Social Network
The village, Ananthagudem (a pseudonym), of approxi-
mately 900 inhabitants is located in the Khammam district of 
AP. Of a total of 212 households, 155 are cultivating farmers; 
141 of the 155 farming households own some land, and 14 
cultivated land leased from others (a few farmers with small 
landholding also lease land). An overwhelming 86% of the 
farmers are smallholders who own less than or equal to 2 
hectares of land. But there are a definitely a few large farm-
ers in the village which makes land distribution in the village 
highly skewed (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the village is 
inhabited by 38 landless-laborer households. The remaining 
households are engaged in non-agricultural professions such 
as small shop owners in the village and construction work in 
a nearby town. A small number of farmers also own shops for 
supplementary income, or drive auto-rickshaw taxis in the 
area. The village is located 6 km from the nearest town, and 
the closest industrial establishment is a thermal power plant 
where two villagers are employed.
Ananthagudem has 10 caste groups. We have caste infor-
mation for 210 out of a total 212 households (Table 1). The 
two remaining households operate small shops in the village 
and do not own any land. The largest group (75 households) 
in Ananthagudem is the Hinduized Koya tribe (see von Fürer-
Haimendorf, 1982, on detribalization or Hinduization of the 
Koyas). A comparable group in size is that of the peasant 
caste, Yadava (62 households). The Lambadi (categorized as 
STs in AP but as Scheduled Castes in Karnataka, Bokil, 2002; 
they also have their own origin myths like other caste groups, 
Karamsi, 2010) and the Dalit Mala (categorized as Scheduled 
Castes) are the third and fourth largest groups, respectively. 
No single group dominated clearly in numbers: The differ-
ence between the two largest groups is only 13. Neither was 
there a domination of one group in economic power as mea-
sured by total land area: The Koyas collectively own 154.4 
acres and the Yadavas own 155 acres. Although the amount of 
land owned per household is different for each caste, these 
inter-caste differences are not substantial.
Quantitative (Network) and Qualitative Data
Quantitative data on the social (friendship) networks of the 
villagers at the level of individual households, and on some 
other socio-economic variables such as landownership, were 
gathered during fieldwork by the first author between 
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September 2005 and April 2006. Rather than collecting data 
with a survey,5 we relied on an inhabitant of the village as the 
source. The data on the social ties of some villagers were 
cross-checked through direct observation and interactions 
with many farmers during several trips to the village over 8 
months. These direct observations and many conversations 
with the farmers (and other inhabitants of the village) were 
also used to collect qualitative data to appreciate how caste 
has become entangled with the world of rural development. 
The latter were essential to understand the development of 
new forms of development-induced brokerage and patronage 
through which the village leaders are able to maintain their 
leadership and sustain their constituencies as communities.
In a classic review of empirical social network studies, 
Marsden (1990) points out that researchers have routinely 
used a variety of sources in collecting network data including 
the approach used here. Our source for the data was a local 
NGO representative who had already lived in the village and 
worked closely with the farmers for 3 years when our field-
work was initiated. Sociality or friendship was identified on 
three criteria: the two friends inter-dine, they freely provide 
help to each other in times of need, and they celebrate (at 
least some of the) local festivals together. Two friends could 
be, and often indeed are, kin. In addition, the NGO worker 
was requested to ensure that any two friends identified by her 
should be close to each other (we used the Telugu word 
daghr). It was implied that two daghr friends, depicted as a 
dyad in the network, will not in general act against each oth-
er’s interests. Note that this daghr-ness in social ties does not 









Koya 75 154.4 2.06
Yadava 62 155 2.5
Lambadi 29 53.5 1.85
Mala (Dalit) 14 47.5 3.39
Mudiraj 10 50.5 5.05
Potter/Carpenter 7 12.5 1.79
Goud 5 8 1.6
Dudekula 4 6 1.5
Choudhary 3 3 1
Reddy 1 0 0
Total 210 490.5 2.34
Figure 1. Distribution of land in acres.
Note. Top: Land owned by a farmer; Bottom: Land cultivated by a farmer.
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exclude relationships in which honor and mutual respect 
(though not always symmetrically) may be exchanged.
The social network of the village is shown in Figure 2. 
Different shapes represent different castes. Some basic 
descriptive statistics of the network are shown in Table 2. The 
statistics of the network, such as the average number of links 
per node in the network or mean degree (z) and the average 
distance of one node from another in the main connected 
component of the network (l), generally fall in the range of 
the statistics for other commonly studied social networks (see 
Table 2). Interestingly, Ananthagudem’s social network is 
(slightly) disassortative, that is, individuals with few links are 
likely to be connected to counterparts with many connections. 
Because the number of social ties often reflects the social sta-
tus of an individual, negative assortative mixing coefficient 
may indicate the prevalence of “patron–client” or “leader-
ship–constituency” type relationships in the social network.
Method for Identifying Tight-Knit Structures
As tight-knit groups (or clusters) are not directly observable, 
one needs to employ data on the network of social relation-
ships to identify clusters. Clustering implies that relation-
ships between members of the same cluster are more 
numerous than inter-cluster links. A community structure 
method is then used to identify the emergent clusters from 
observed social network data. We use a modularity-based 
leading eigenvector method developed by Newman (2006).
Here, we briefly outline the algorithmic procedure used; 
for additional details, we refer to the original article (Newman, 
2006). For the null model, we pick a random graph with the 
same degree distribution as Ananthagudem’s social network. 
Now, for any partition of the network into different clusters, 
modularity is defined as the difference between the number 
of edges within identified clusters and the “expected” num-
ber of such edges (“expected” refers to the null model). Thus, 
the modularity value is a measure of the advantage derived 
from describing an observed network in terms of clusters, as 
compared with the baseline model of random connections.
We begin by partitioning the network into two sub-net-
works (or clusters) such that this particular partition maxi-
mizes the modularity (Newman, 2006). Following this, 
partitioning the network into more than two clusters is 
achieved through sequential application of the algorithm to 
the two sub-networks, each of which is bisected. If a pro-
posed bisection of a sub-network does not yield a gain in 
overall modularity value, it is an indivisible cluster and no 
further divisions of this sub-network should be made. We 
stop when no divisible sub-network remains. The resulting 
set of indivisible clusters defines a partition with approxi-
mately the maximized modularity value.
Newman (2006) proposes to complement each step of the 
above procedure with a “fine-tuning” routine. According to 
this, after initial separation of nodes into two clusters (and 
indeed after each subsequent bisection), the following steps 
should be performed. First, we find a node which if moved to 
the other cluster would yield the largest gain, or the smallest 
loss, in modularity. Second, we move such a node to the 
other cluster. Third, we repeat the first step considering only 
those vertices that have not been moved yet, from both clus-
ters. Once a move for all vertices has been attempted, we 
inspect the configurations of possible moves to select only 
the configuration that provides the largest gain in modularity, 
and run the procedure from the beginning again until it gives 
no further improvements in modularity. The end result of this 
fine-tuning procedure is a gain in modularity and the modu-
larity value is maximized.
Results and Discussion
The dispersion of each caste across 13 identified clusters 
(labeled A-L) is shown in Table 3. Members of the largest 
group, Koya, can be found in 9 clusters. Three of the clusters 
(C, E, and M) are Koya only, containing 31%, 25%, and 10% 
of the village’s Koya population, respectively. The Yadavas 
are also dispersed across 9 clusters, but slightly more than 
half of the village’s Yadavas are members of Clusters A and 
F (24% and 27%, respectively). The Lambadis are present in 
5 clusters but are concentrated in 2: B (79%) and L (11%). 
The other mid-sized caste group of Malas (with 14 members) 
join Cluster H without splitting. Members of the smaller 
castes of the village (with 10 or fewer members) are gener-
ally split across 2 clusters.
The caste composition of each cluster is shown in Table 4. 
The largest clusters, A and B have 25 people belonging to 
four different castes in each case. Apart from the 3 Koya-
only clusters (C, E, and M), 2 other clusters (F and H) are 
predominantly single caste, with more than 90% of their 
Figure 2. Caste-based distribution in the social network of 
Ananthagudem inhabitants.
Note. Data on connections of the four people depicted as isolates in the 
top right-hand corner of the figure were not available.
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members being Yadava and Mala, respectively. Thus, 8 of 13 
clusters in Ananthagudem are clearly multi-caste, constituted 
by members of two to five different castes. It is however 
important to note that in all but 2 of these multi-caste clus-
ters, a single caste provides the majority (more than 50%) of 
members. Only in Clusters D and G no single caste consti-
tutes a clear majority.
In most clusters, caste appears to play an important role in 
shaping the emergent network structure. Barring two clusters 
(D and G), the majority of each cluster’s members belong to 
a single caste. Yet, the effect of caste on community ties 
Table 3. Dispersion of a Caste Group Across Clusters.
Cluster/caste A B C D E F G H I J K L M Caste size
Koya .06 .01 .31 .00 .25 .00 .03 .00 .15 .01 .08 .00 .10 72
Yadava .24 .02 .00 .11 .00 .27 .08 .00 .02 .15 .03 .08 .00 62
Lambadi .04 .79 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .04 .00 .00 .11 .00 28
Mala .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 14
Mudiraj .00 .00 .00 .80 .00 .00 .20 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 10
Potter .00 .00 .00 .86 .00 .14 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 7
Goud .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .80 .00 .00 .20 .00 .00 .00 5
Dudekula .00 .00 .00 .25 .00 .00 .75 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 4
Choudhary 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 3
Reddy .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1
Unknown 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 2
Cluster size 25 25 22 22 18 18 16 15 13 11 8 8 7  
Note. Fractions in each row of the table sum up to 1.00.
Table 4. Caste Composition of Each Cluster.
Cluster/caste A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Koya .16 .04 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 .13 .00 .85 .09 .75 .00 1.00
Yadava .60 .04 .00 .32 .00 .94 .31 .00 .08 .82 .25 .63 .00
Lambadi .04 .88 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .08 .00 .00 .38 .00
Mala .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .93 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Mudiraj .00 .00 .00 .36 .00 .00 .13 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Potter .00 .00 .00 .27 .00 .06 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Goud .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .25 .00 .00 .09 .00 .00 .00
Dudekula .00 .00 .00 .05 .00 .00 .19 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Choudhary .12 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Reddy .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Unknown .08 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Size 25 25 22 22 18 18 16 15 13 11 8 8 7
Number of castes  4  4  1  4  1  2  5  2  3  3 2 2 1
Note. Fractions in each column of the table sum up to 1.00.
Table 2. Basic Statistics for Ananthagudem’s Social Network and Other Published Social Networks.
Network Type n m z L C r
Ananthagudem Undirected 212 498 4.79 4.53 0.29 −.032
 Company directors Undirected 7,673 55,392 14.44 4.60 0.59 .276
 Student relationships Undirected 573 477 1.66 16.01 0.01 −.029
 Zachary karate cluba Undirected 34 78 4.59 2.38 0.24 −.475
Source. Adapted from Newman (2003).
Note. Basic network statistics are the total number of nodes (n), number of links (m), mean degree (z), average distance in the largest connected 
component (l), transitivity (clustering coefficient = C), and assortative mixing coefficient (r).
aOur calculations, network data taken from Mark Newman’s webpage http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/netdata/
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might be masking other strong effects such as those due to 
family, lineage, neighborhood, affinal connections to outside 
the village, shared occupations, and the distribution of agri-
cultural knowledge/expertise in the village (cf. Klass, 1972; 
Mosse, 1999; Oommen, 1970). For instance, even if lineage 
(or another factor) is more important in driving peoples’ 
community tie formation, we would observe single-caste 
clusters simply because members of the same lineage belong 
to the same caste. In the following statistical exercise, we 
illustrate this point by disentangling the effects of caste and 
lineage.
We examine the effects of the two factors by estimating a 
simple alternative-specific conditional logit model: For each 
individual household, we estimate the effect of caste and lin-
eage on the probability that it joins 1 of the 13 identified 
clusters. The dependent variable yij is equal to 1 if individual 
belongs to cluster, and 0 otherwise.6 The results of estimation 
are reported in Table 5 (cluster dummies reflect the effect of 
cluster sizes and composition of the clusters are not reported). 
First, we estimated a model with CASTE covariate and clus-
ter-specific constants (Model 1). The results confirm that 
caste is an important factor in defining the composition of 
clusters. Then we estimated a model with CASTE, FAMILY, 
and cluster dummies (Model 2). Introduction of the lineage 
effect largely moderates the coefficient of CASTE and 
slightly reduces its statistical significance (its p value 
becomes .003). It also significantly improves the overall fit 
of the model almost doubling the pseudo-R2 statistics. Thus, 
the results suggest that lineage has a much stronger influence 
on the formation of clusters than caste.
Moving on to caste’s entanglement with the political cul-
ture of rural development, in village-level forums such as the 
GP, interests of large castes, due to their sheer size and inter-
nal diversity, may not be easily represented by a single-caste 
headman (cf. Oommen, 1970). Such large caste groups gener-
ally include members of different lineages. They also have a 
range of agriculturalists, from mid-sized farmers to the land-
less, whose (economic) interests may diverge from each 
other. In general, as Simmel (1908/2009) argued long ago, 
one can expect a general loss of internal cohesion with growth 
in size of a group because norms (that may drive cohesion, 
for instance, through loyalty to headmen) in large groups 
tend to become more impersonal and often unsuitable to the 
needs of all. Correspondingly in the results, shown in Table 
3, we observe that the two large caste groups in Ananthagudem, 
Yadava and Koya, are distributed across multiple clusters.
We observe a lower degree of dispersion in the two mid-
sized caste groups in Ananthagudem, Lambadi and Mala 
with 28 and 14 members, respectively. The Dalit Mala’s alto-
gether join Cluster H, a result that supports Still’s (2013) 
observation in the AP village she studied that inter-caste ties 
may be formed more easily between members of non-Dalit 
castes rather than between Dalits and non-Dalits. 
Ananthagudem’s Cluster H has only one non-Mala member, 
who shares the same occupation, auto-rickshaw driver, with 
at least two Mala men.7 He also lives in the same neighbor-
hood as the Malas. Overall, Mala is the only caste group in 
Ananthagudem with almost the same boundaries as a cluster. 
Major reasons for this cohesion among the Malas are as fol-
lows: (a) almost all Malas in Ananthagudem belong to a 
single lineage, (b) they are recipients of specifically targeted 
state development programs that are exclusive to them in 
Ananthagudem (one such successful program implemented 
during the time of our fieldwork was mulberry cultivation for 
silkworms and fruit), (c) Malas as Dalits have been widely 
persecuted by the upper castes in AP and often follow their 
own (non-upper caste) cultural value systems, and (d) effec-
tive leadership from the caste headman who is a highly 
respected member of many village-level committees includ-
ing the GP. More on leadership will be discussed later.
The Lambadis are concentrated in two clusters: 22 in B 
and 3 in L. In both clusters, they form community ties with 
members of other castes living in their neighborhood (3 in 
Cluster B and 5 in Cluster L). Many Lambadis generally 
worked closely with the development NGO working in the 
village, which seems to be a driving factor in cluster forma-
tion. For instance, in Cluster L, two people (the Lambadi 
caste headman and a Yadava) are both “resource persons” of 
the NGO in the village. The resource persons play a critical 
role in mobilizing people for the NGO’s development proj-
ects and distributing project benefits among the villagers 
(more on this later). Similar close affiliation to the NGO can 
be observed in the larger Lambadi-dominated Cluster B, one 
of whose members is in fact the only NGO employee living 
in the village.
The smaller caste groups (Mudiraj, Potter/Carpenter, 
Goud, Dudekula except Choudhary) split up and join two 
different clusters. Most small caste groups are perhaps not 
(numerically) strong enough to prop their own leaders at the 
village level. In general, one or two members of each of these 
castes do not stick with the rest of their caste group in joining 
a larger cluster. For example, six of seven members of Potter/
Carpenter caste are in Cluster D whereas the last one is in 
Cluster F. The only small caste group that does not get split 
across two clusters is Choudhary. All three members of this 
Table 5. The Effects of Caste and Lineage: Alternative-Specific 
Conditional Logit Model.
Model 1 Model 2
CASTE 5.0 (0.45) 1.9 (0.59)
FAMILY 5.4 (0.46)
Log likelihood −270.60 −148.48
Wald χ2,a 119.39 234.58
pseudo-R2,b .33 .63
Note. All estimated coefficients are significant at 1% level. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis.
aSignificant at 1% level.
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caste are present in Cluster A. The headman of the 
Choudharys, despite their small numerical strength, is argu-
ably the most influential individual in the village. He is an 
important dairy farmer, which is one of the more profitable 
professions in Ananthagudem. In addition, he cultivated 13 
acres of land (3 owned and 10 leased) in 2005-2006. He is 
close to the main crop-buyer, credit-provider, and farm-input 
supplier to Ananthagudem, and to the GP president (also a 
member of Cluster A). In fact, Cluster A is home to some 
other prominent people in the village, including the headman 
of the Yadavas,8 and a local moneylender who is also a GP 
member. Both also work as resource persons for the local 
NGO. Thus, Cluster A is the closest we find to a core cluster, 
or “power center,” in Ananthagudem’s social network. It also 
has the highest group (closeness and degree) centrality val-
ues of all clusters, as shown in Table 6.9 However, note that 
the coreness of Cluster A, or its position as the center of 
Ananthagudem, is quite weak as a number of other powerful 
individuals are dispersed across different clusters. Thus, 
(important) members of the core Cluster A cannot indepen-
dently make decisions for the entire village without consult-
ing other cluster leaders.
The above result on the lack of a clearly dominant cluster 
in Ananthagudem’s social network can be confirmed by 
comparing the average landownership in each cluster. As the 
distribution of land in the village is not normal (Figure 1), we 
tested the averages using Kruskal–Wallis test (a non-para-
metric analogue to one-way ANOVA). The results of the test 
are reported in Table 7. The null hypothesis of the means 
being equal across the clusters for both owned and cultivated 
land cannot be rejected; thus, there is no evidence that some 
clusters are definitely more important or powerful than oth-
ers. This confirms that powerful individuals (large farmers) 
in the village do not form an elite clique on their own. It also 
implies that no “rural or agrarian rich layer” is dominating in 
the village, exploiting other poorer villagers and exclusively 
protecting their own interests.
Until now, we have focused on how caste (and lineage) 
identities, moderated by the size of a caste group, influence 
the cluster structure of the social network. This quantitative 
analysis has thus focused on the extent to which caste- and 
lineage-based homophily manifests in Ananthagudem’s net-
work. While pointing to this influence of homophily, we 
have remained alert to heterogeneity within individual tight-
knit clusters. However, to fully appreciate the manifestation 
of heterogeneity in the clusters, we need to adopt a (largely) 
qualitative approach in the following. Quantitative social 
network analysis is still used to identify the leaders in every 
cluster. For each leader, we discuss their attributes (caste sta-
tus, formal office, landholdings, etc.) that place them in a 
position to act as patrons of their constituencies. In addition, 
we attempt to understand who is included and who gets 
excluded from overall leadership at the village level. The 
leaders are identified using measures of intra-cluster influ-
ence and decision-making power (estimated using closeness 
centrality within her/his cluster/constituency) and the poten-
tial to negotiate with other clusters due to her/his position in 
the network (inter-clique betweenness measure developed by 
Gould, 1989).
For each cluster, individuals with the highest values of the 
product of the two measures are listed in Table 8.10 We iden-
tify one leader per cluster. In general, these leaders have sub-
stantially higher values of the product than the rest of the 
cluster. A complete list of all individuals with non-zero val-
ues, that is, individuals who have at least one link to someone 
outside their own cluster, is available on request from the 
authors.
The leader of Cluster A is the headman of the Choudharys. 
The influence of this large cultivator and dairy farmer is far 
greater than is reflected by the small size of his caste group 
in the village. As already noted, he runs a profitable dairy 
business, supplying milk to buyers outside Ananthagudem. 
His influence also stems from his closeness to the main farm-
input (pesticides, fertilizers, seeds) supplier to the village. 
This farm-input supplier runs a shop in the nearby town and 
is the only such shop owner in town who provides the farm 
inputs on credit to the Ananthagudem farmers. He is also the 
single most important source of agricultural knowledge for 
the village’s farmers. The leader of Cluster A is himself also 
a central source of agricultural knowledge and problem- 
solving advice in the village (Arora, 2012). In addition to his 
local socio-economic and cognitive position, influence from 
the statewide clout of the Choudhary caste may be an impor-
tant factor in buttressing his prominence in Ananthagudem.11
The leader of the Lambadi-dominated Cluster B is son of a 
local (Lambadi) moneylender who lends small amounts to other 
Lambadis as well as members of other castes in the village. In 
Table 6. Cluster (Group) Centrality Values.
Cluster A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Degree centrality 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
Closeness centrality 0.41 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.29
Table 7. Kruskal–Wallis Test for the Average Landholding in 
Clusters.
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addition, he was actively involved in the developmental 
work of the local NGO, as were many other Lambadis to 
whom he was connected, particularly in relation to sustain-
able agriculture. Sustainable agriculture was the most impor-
tant work carried out by the NGO in the village, for which 
Ananthagudem had become famous all across AP as an eco-
village. It was widely reported that the local farmers were 
very successful in adopting and adapting low-cost environ-
mentally friendly agricultural practices (Arora, 2012). The 
leader of Cluster B was one of the farmers at the forefront of 
this sustainable agriculture movement. The potential of the 
leader of Cluster C to act as patron of his constituency is less 
clear on any developmental grounds. His identification as the 
cluster leader here appears to depend on his membership of 
one of two largest lineages, Palam with 13 households in 
Ananthagudem. Cluster C is composed of Koyas only.
The leader of Cluster D is the Dudekula caste headman. In 
addition to being a farmer, he owns a successful shop in the 
village, from which he also carries out small repairs (often 
free of cost). He is possibly the only trained electrician in the 
village, which puts him much in demand for solving electric-
ity-related problems that villagers may encounter. He also 
undertakes electric jobs outside the village. He has friend-
ship ties with a number of other prominent villagers, includ-
ing the village GP president. And, like the leader of Cluster 
A, he is a close friend of the powerful farm-input supplier to 
the village, which puts him in a good position for providing 
indirect patronage to other members of his cluster.
The Koya-only Cluster E is led by the head of the large 
(13-member) Velu lineage. The leader of this cluster is the 
secretary of the GP and a “resource person” for the local 
NGO. Although he owns only 2 acres of land, he leases 
another 10, which is the largest amount of land leased by 
anyone in Ananthagudem. Cultivating these 12 acres and 
being an NGO “resource person” allows him to act as a 
development broker between the farmers in his cluster and 
the local NGO. Cluster F is led by a member of eight-strong 
Datla lineage (Yadava), whose potential for patronage is 
unclear.
Cluster G is led by a prominent farmer who doubles as a 
moneylender in the village, which clearly puts him in good 
stead to act as a patron in his community. This role is 
cemented by his position as a local official (secretary) in the 
Village Tribal Development Authority (VTDA). The VTDA 
generally channels government resources targeted at tribal 
groups (e.g., Koya). These development funds may be used 
to strengthen local education, health, irrigation infrastruc-
ture, and women’s savings groups. In this cluster leader’s 
case then, it is not brokerage between the development NGO 
and members of his cluster that affords his leadership and 
influence, but rather that between a government agency and 
the (tribal) villagers.
Cluster H is led by the highly respected Mala headman. 
This headman is an active member of many village-level 
committees including the GP and a farmers’ consultation 
group on sustainable agriculture (and micro-credit) orga-
nized by the local NGO. He is also a resource person of the 
local NGO. Membership of the GP and proximity to the local 
NGO allows him to act as a patron for members of his clus-
ter, which includes all members of his caste in the village. In 
fact, the Mala headman (and his cluster) exemplifies the 
alignment of the caste’s facet of intra-caste leadership (and 
community/constituency) with development-based broker-
age (and patronage).
Cluster I is headed by a younger brother of the caste head-
man of the Koyas (the latter himself leads Cluster K). The 
leader of Cluster I owns the largest amount of land in the 
Veena lineage and his landholding is the third largest among 
the Koyas. Barring two, all members of this cluster are Koya. 
Cluster J is led by the Goud registered medical practitioner in 
the village. In addition to his medical practice, which attracts 
patients from all castes in the village, he runs a profitable 
Table 8. Leaders in Each Cluster.
Name Cluster (size, # castes) Caste In cluster closeness
Inter-cluster 
betweenness Product
Gorinta, E. G. A (25, 4) Choudhary 0.429 0.915 0.392
Yarla, F. R. B (25, 4) Lambadi 0.393 0.187 0.073
Palam, H. V. C (22, 1) Koya 0.538 0.272 0.146
Joardar, G. X. D (22, 4) Dudekula 0.512 0.321 0.165
Velu, H. O. E (18, 1) Koya 0.586 0.617 0.361
Datla, B. S. F (18, 2) Yadava 0.680 0.140 0.095
Sapna, F. C. G (16, 5) Koya 0.455 0.474 0.215
Koli, E. D. H (15, 2) Mala 0.778 1.000 0.778
Veena, I. E. I (13, 3) Koya 0.800 0.140 0.112
Pai, D. J. J (11, 3) Goud 0.476 0.210 0.100
Veena, I. G. K (8, 2) Koya 0.700 0.716 0.501
Yarla, F. Q. L (8, 2) Lambadi 0.467 0.399 0.186
Sapna, E. W. M (7, 1) Koya 0.667 0.256 0.171
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dairy business and often acts as a veterinarian for the vil-
lage’s cattle. He has friendship ties with the GP president and 
some other prominent people in the village.
The eight-member Clusters K and L are led by the head-
men of the Koya and the Lambadi, respectively. Both head-
men are resource persons for the local NGO and members of 
the farmers’ consultation group on sustainable agriculture. 
As headmen, they are responsible for settling intra-personal 
disputes in the village. The Lambadi headman is perhaps the 
most important resource person for the local NGO in the vil-
lage. He has been instrumental in securing small loans, 
through the NGO, for promoting non-farm entrepreneurial 
activities in the village and helped initiate other projects 
including assistance with the local primary school and live-
stock health. He has traveled to different parts of AP as an 
advocate of low-cost sustainable agriculture practices pro-
moted by the NGO. Thus, the Lambadi headman is the per-
fect broker who appears loyal to the NGO and its development 
projects, while attempting to strategically secure benefits for 
the poorer members of his cluster/constituency (and beyond 
through collaboration with other cluster leaders). He is con-
sidered to be an expert in sustainable agricultural methods, 
and approached by many farmers for advice. He is also a 
land-sale administrator in Ananthagudem.
Finally, the smallest Cluster M is a Koya-only cluster led 
by the head of the 11-household Sapna lineage, which is the 
third largest lineage group in the village. The Sapna leader 
has the largest landholding in his lineage, which is second 
only to the GP president among the Ananthagudem Koya as 
a whole. In addition to being a moneylender in the village, he 
is also a resource person for the local development NGO and 
considered knowledgeable in sustainable farming methods 
introduced by the NGO.
Thus, leadership in most clusters is associated with char-
acteristics such as landownership, ability or propensity to 
lend money, caste headmanship, agricultural expertise, and 
the ability to act as a development broker between govern-
mental organizations and NGOs and the village. The latter 
role of mediation between development agencies and the vil-
lagers is facilitated by membership in village-level councils 
and committees such as the GP, and serving as “resource per-
sons” for the local NGO. In this way, the leaders are able to 
play the role of local village-level patrons who may secure 
resources for their constituencies in the form of loans, subsi-
dies, participation in sustainable development projects, and 
knowledge (technical advice). In addition, the leaders pro-
vide voice to, and further the interests of, the poorer mem-
bers of their constituencies or clusters in village-level forums 
on the organization of local development. Of course, not all 
cluster leaders were in a straightforward position to act as 
patrons or powerful enough to provide a voice to their cluster 
members. This applies particularly to leaders of Clusters C 
and F (H. V. Palam and B. S. Datla). Members of the Palam 
and Datla lineages, including the leaders of Clusters C and F, 
are among the poorest in Ananthagudem with little or no 
landholding. They also did not have direct access to the local 
NGO or any other development agencies (state or non-state) 
from outside the village. Thus, their ability to act as cluster 
leaders is unclear.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to study how caste cultures 
and development brokerage/patronage interact with and 
adjust to each other in fluidly shaping the social network 
structure of a south Indian village. We studied the latter by 
dividing the social network of the village into 13 tight-knit 
clusters. While the importance of caste as community and of 
intra-caste leadership can be observed in the composition of 
some network clusters, more than half the clusters in the net-
work were clearly multi-caste. Only one caste group came 
close to forming a cluster of their own (the Dalit Mala). The 
largest group in the village, Koyas, was split across 9 clus-
ters, but 3 of these clusters were Koya only. All other caste 
groups were split across multi-caste clusters and routinely 
formed friendship ties with members of other castes in the 
village. Thus friendship ties and communities in general, as 
observed in this south Indian village, are not strictly divided 
along caste lines, and the influence of caste on community 
network structures (while clearly important) appears to be 
both variable and fluid.
Even where the influence of caste identity on network 
structure appears important, it may be masking other drivers 
of cluster formation such as family, lineage, and shared occu-
pation. In addition, homophily, observed in (some of) the 
clusters through caste affiliation and other forms of shared-
ness through lineage or occupation, co-exists with consider-
able heterogeneity among cluster members arising out of 
close association with development organizations and/or 
expressed through unequal relations of power operating in 
patron–client networks. Thus, network communities or clus-
ters are formed and sustained not only on the basis of some 
form of cultural sharedness (e.g., proximity through caste or 
lineage) but also on the basis of forms of heterogeneity due 
to newer distinctions and leadership (e.g., derived through 
proximity to development institutions) and emerging param-
eters of patronage.
The sources of individual leadership, and of friendship 
ties between some of the cluster leaders, in the village are 
generally multiple. Leadership is derived, for instance, on 
the basis of development brokerage and patronage, caste 
headmanship, lineage, occupation, expertise, landownership, 
and the ability to act as local creditors. Thus, while owner-
ship of large parcels of land and concomitant class interests 
are important, caste and lineage continue to act as strong 
sources of leadership, as do new forms of patronage arising 
out of proximity to development institutions. And, although 
there may be some overlap between these sources, none of 
them can be viewed as a handmaiden to others. In this sense 
then, caste (or community-based development) is not simply 
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a tool that is instrumentally deployed by the rural rich to fur-
ther their class interests. Caste, as we have documented 
above, also forms a basis of convivial community ties and, 
as documented extensively in the anthropological literature 
on caste (see section “Political Cultures of Caste and 
Development in South India”), helps constitute struggles for 
equality waged by the oppressed and marginalized in Indian 
society. And, these struggles and communities (as constitu-
encies) may produce their own leaders whose actions cannot 
simply be reduced to their own class interests. Thus, no sin-
gle source of leadership is subservient to and subsumed by 
another. Yet, these distributed sources of leadership and the 
presence of patron–client type of relations within network 
clusters nevertheless imply that most cluster leaders (acting 
as patrons) had an interest in affording the creation of close-
knit communities out of their constituencies (or clients).
This brings us to the observation that cultures are better 
envisioned as multidimensional and shifting landscapes that 
are thoroughly embedded in everyday relations, rather than 
as (normative) structures that operate from above (or behind 
the back of) individuals and communities (cf. Latour, 2005). 
It is within everyday practice that “traditional” idioms such 
as those of caste (with their individual and collective aspects) 
are fluidly enacted and become entangled with newer institu-
tional patterns. It is within the everyday that older sources of 
status and power are negotiated with and become enmeshed 
with newer bases of authority, to constitute a cultural patch-
work that is riddled with inequality and difference. In this 
article, we have attempted to show how this uneven patch-
work of “tradition” and “modernity” shapes social networks, 
not solely through the sharedness of norms and values but 
also through asymmetric power and authority.
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Notes
 1. Dalit, literally meaning the downtrodden, was a name chosen by 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar to refer to the “untouchables.” Regarding 
political assertions, it is perhaps erroneous to assume that all 
members of a lower caste in a village are engaged in such 
assertions. Still (2009), for example, observes that the greater 
the economic dependence on an upper caste landlord (patron), 
the more common the practice of subordination by a lower 
caste member. Although the latter may not necessarily accept 
any values that underpin the system of subordination.
 2. In addition, a third of all seats are reserved for women. And, 
similar elections are to be held for sub-district- (block) and 
district-level representatives (Johnson, 2003).
 3. In the post-73rd amendment era, Gram Panchayat (GP) election 
candidates often need to fulfill certain conditions, other than the 
membership of certain castes or tribes, such as gender, minimum 
educational qualification, age-limit, number of children, and so on. 
In many cases, where caste headmen themselves do not qualify 
they attempt to get their candidates elected. In fact the latter may 
often be elected without a contest (Ananth Pur & Moore, 2010).
 4. There may of course be exceptions to the alignment of new 
and old leaders depicted here. In some cases, the new leaders 
may compete with and weaken the authority of the older lead-
ers (see Price, 2006).
 5. A number of problems in using surveys for collecting network 
data with self-reports by respondents have been identified (see 
Marsden, 1990, for a review). The problems with survey data 
are believed to be most severe for social support or friendship 
networks.
 6. The explanatory variables are FAMILY
ij
, defined as the share 
of other members of the lineage of individual i in cluster j, 
and CASTE
ij
, the share of the members of the same caste as 
individual i in cluster j. The statistical model requires non-zero 




 with respect 
to j for each i, therefore we had to exclude those individuals 
from the analysis who either have no identified extended fam-
ily ties within the village or for whom caste is unknown or the 
local caste group consists of only one member. This reduction 
leaves us with 163 (of 210) individual cases.
 7. Most Ananthagudem residents as we have already noted are 
agriculturalists. Thus, a minority profession such as auto- 
rickshaw drivers who ply their rickshaws outside the village 
can act as an important driver for cluster formation. The auto-
rickshaw drivers need to share information and knowledge 
about agencies that finance auto-rickshaws, repair workshops, 
routes on which to ply the rickshaws as mini-buses, auto- 
component shops, and solving small problems with their machines.
 8. The Yadava headman did not want to play the role of a caste 
headman because it brought obligations toward poor members 
of his caste – obligations that he did not want to meet.
 9. Group centrality was calculated according to the procedure 
proposed by Freeman (1979), and it provides a rough measure 
of the power and influence of a group in the network. Degree 
centrality is a measure based on the number of direct ties of 
(the members of) a group to others in the network, whereas 
closeness centrality is based on the distance of a group from 
others in the network.
10. Before taking the product, we normalize Gould’s inter-clique 
betweenness by dividing each value by the difference between 
the global maximum and minimum. All names listed in Table 8 
are pseudonyms.
11. Choudhary (often called Kamma) is one of two main landown-
ing (upper) castes in Andhra Pradesh and effectively controls 
the Telugu Desam party, which won the state elections in 1994 
and 1999.
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